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Abstract — Video encryption techniques enable 
applications like digital rights management and video 
scrambling. Applying encryption on the entire video stream 
can be computationally costly and prevents advanced video 
modifications by an untrusted middlebox in the network, like 
splicing, quality monitoring, watermarking, and transcoding. 
Therefore, encryption techniques are proposed which 
influence a small amount of the video stream while keeping 
the video compliant with its compression standard, High 
Efficiency Video Coding. Encryption while guaranteeing 
standard compliance can cause degraded compression 
efficiency, so depending on their bitrate impact, a selection of 
encrypted syntax elements should be made. Each element also 
impacts the quality for untrusted decoders differently, so this 
aspect should also be considered. In this paper, multiple 
techniques for partial video encryption are investigated, most 
of them having a low impact on rate-distortion performance 
and having a broad range in scrambling performance1. 
 
Index Terms — High Efficiency Video Coding, encryption, 
transcoding, video scrambling 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Applications using video encryption can range from pay TV 
up to confidential military applications. When confidentiality 
is of the highest priority, encryption of the entire video stream 
is advised. In a scenario of television distribution, some 
disadvantages can be associated with full video encryption.  
First, useful technical information, irrelevant for end users, 
becomes obscured. For example, a video stream contains 
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information about the used compression standard, the used 
profile, and picture width and height. Leaving this information 
unencrypted can give the end user device an indication about 
the decodability of the video stream or the resolution of this 
premium service.  
Second, encrypting the entire video stream removes its 
format compliance with the video standard. Because of 
encryption, the data gets randomized, resulting in unexpected 
behavior of the decoding equipment. With a format compliant 
encryption solution, there is certainty about the expected 
behavior of all intermediate and end user devices in the video 
chain. The downside of having to guarantee standard 
compliance is that by encrypting certain syntax elements, the 
statistics of the video stream change, resulting in a higher 
bitrate for the same video. Therefore, attention should be paid 
to which video stream elements get encrypted.  
Third, with full stream encryption, adaptation devices in the 
network need to be trusted with the decryption key in order to 
make changes to the video stream. With only a small amount 
of encrypted elements in the video stream, adaptation devices 
are free to modify other elements in the video stream. In this 
way, without knowing the encryption key, modifications [1] 
like compressed domain watermarking [2] and transcoding [3] 
are possible.  
Finally, when only encrypting certain syntax elements in the 
video stream, the scrambling intensity of the video stream can 
be configured. With full stream encryption, no visual 
information is revealed about the video stream. Sometimes it 
can be beneficial to offer low quality preview functionality in 
order to convince the viewer. Different syntax elements will 
impact the decoded quality of an untrusted device differently 
and therefore the elements to encrypt should be chosen 
depending on the quality offered to untrusted devices.  
In this paper, encryption of different elements from the 
video stream is investigated. As a video compression 
algorithm to work with, the recently standardized High 
Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC) standard [4] is used. How 
such a video stream is structured and which syntax elements 
can be used for encryption is explained in Section II. How 
adaptation and encryption worked on older video compression 
standards like H.264/AVC and Scalable Video Coding (SVC) 
is described in Section III. Then, in Section IV, the proposed 
encryption algorithm working on HEVC will be explained. 
Finally, Section V and Section VI will show the broad range in 
scrambling performance and the conclusion, respectively. 
 II. HIGH EFFICIENCY VIDEO CODING 
In January 2013, a joint collaborative team between the 
Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) and the Video Coding 
Experts Group (VCEG) finished the standardization of HEVC. 
This standard is the successor of the dominantly present 
H.264/AVC [5] compression standard and it outperforms the 
former with 50% in bitrate reduction at similar subjective 
quality [6]. Although HEVC is still a hybrid block based video 
compression standard as H.264/AVC, there are some 
fundamental differences explaining this performance leap.  
When looking at a video stream from a high level of 
abstraction, first, the video stream is divided in pictures. With 
inter predicted pictures, prediction from previously decoded 
pictures can happen, i.e. reference pictures. The set of 
reference pictures is signaled as a table in the short-term 
Reference Picture Set (RPS). During the actual inter 
prediction, as will be explained later, only an index in this 
table needs to be sent in the video stream in order to predict 
from a certain picture. 
Every picture is further divided in slices. These slices form 
independently decodable parts of the video stream. Each slice 
gets wrapped in a Network Abstraction Layer (NAL) unit 
containing a NAL header and the actual slice information. In 
the NAL header, high level information about the picture type 
can be found. This picture type can be used to distinguish the 
random access pictures from inter predicted pictures. 
A slice consists of several Coding Tree Units (CTU). For 
HEVC, a rate-distortion-complexity trade off indicated a CTU 
size of 64x64 as a good compromise. Smaller sizes down to 
16x16 can be chosen if preferred. As a comparison with 
H.264/AVC, the corresponding structure was called 
MacroBlocks (MB) and their size was fixed to 16x16 pixels.  
The CTU is further divided in a quad tree of Coding Units 
(CU). CUs can be partitioned in sizes ranging from 64x64 
down to 8x8. On the CU level, information about the block 
type is signaled (inter or intra). Additionally, for rate-control 
purposes, a change in quality and bitrate can be controlled up 
to this level, as will be explained later. The CU forms the root 
for further partitioning in Prediction Units (PU) and Transform 
Units (TU). 
With an intra-coded CU, the CU can be further split in PU 
partitions of size 2Nx2N which represents no split and NxN 
which represents a split in four sub partitions. Partitioning 
inter-coded CUs can happen with more flexibility such that 
rectangular and asymmetrical splits can occur as well. For each 
of these inter-coded PU partitions, motion information is 
signaled in the video stream. The motion can be predicted 
from the motion in neighboring blocks. This merging of 
motion information starts with the creation of a list of merge 
candidates. From these candidates, one is selected and signaled 
in the video stream with a merge index (idx). When no merge 
occurs, all the motion information needs to be explicitly 
mentioned in the video stream. If the PU is unidirectional 
predicted, one Motion Vector (MV) and corresponding 
information is included. With bidirectional prediction, two sets 
of this information are signaled. First, because previously 
decoded pictures can be used to predict from, an index 
indicating the reference picture is signaled, i.e. reference 
picture index. Second, the MV is constructed by a MV 
Prediction (MVP) process. In this process, a candidate list of 
MVs is created and an index is included indicating the used 
MV predictor. This index will be further named MVP index. 
Now that a motion vector prediction is obtained, the difference 
with the motion vector, called the MV Difference (MVD), still 
needs to be signaled in the video stream. For this purpose, a 
MVD sign and MVD size are put in the video stream. 
As with the PUs, again, a quad tree partitioning with the CU 
as a root can be performed obtaining TUs. The pixels 
corresponding to the TU size are transformed and quantized. 
The Quantization Parameter (QP) controlling the eventual 
quality and bitrate can be set and adjusted on different levels 
in the video stream, namely on picture level, on slice level, and 
on CU level. This is mainly used for matching the bitrate to a 
certain value in rate-control applications. 
Within the TU, first the position of the last significant 
coefficient and the significance of the different coefficients is 
signaled. Then, the absolute level of the coefficients and their 
sign information are put in the video stream. So, with the 
positions of significant coefficients, their sign, and their size, a 
reconstruction of the residual information can be made. In 
HEVC, there is an additional tool giving small gains called 
Sign Data Hiding (SDH). With this tool enabled and under 
certain conditions, the sign of the first significant coefficient is 
inferred from the parity of the sum all the coefficients. 
After reconstruction in an HEVC decoder, some final in loop 
filtering stages are processed, namely the deblocking filter and 
the Sample Adaptive Offset (SAO) filter. For these filters, also 
some signaling takes place in the video stream. More 
specifically, parameters controlling the strength of the 
deblocking filter and parameters to enable the SAO filter need 
to be communicated. 
All the different elements like the partitioning structure, the 
motion information, and the residual information need to get in 
binary form when put in the video stream. For this purpose, 
HEVC uses a binarization stage followed by Context-Adaptive 
Binary Arithmetic Coding (CABAC). This CABAC engine 
learns about the statistics of a certain video element and 
throughout the slice spends less bits on frequently occurring 
values. With this CABAC entropy coder, some final 
redundancies are removed from the bit stream. From some 
elements, it was observed that they occur too random to spend 
CABAC processing on, so they get bypass encoded. This 
means that their binary form is put in the bit stream without 
further compression. In HEVC, bypass encoding is used for 
the MV sign, the residual sign, and SAO signaling. 
 III. ADAPTATION ON ENCRYPTED VIDEO 
Considering all different steps in the HEVC coding process, 
there is still a lot of resemblance with H.264/AVC. Currently, 
there is not a lot of research describing encryption and 
adaptation for HEVC. Therefore, in this section, an overview 
is given of frequently occurring adaptation operations and their 
requirements related to encryption. 
As a first application, splicing can be considered. Splicing is 
the process in which a fragment from a different video stream 
is inserted in a video stream. Splicing is mainly used for 
advertisement insertion or other editing operations. For a 
splicing operation to work, there needs to be access to 
information related to random access in the video stream. This 
information can be found in the NAL header, so encryption of 
the NAL header should be avoided to enable this type of 
modification on the video stream. 
Second, no-reference quality measurement or monitoring 
could be applied in the network. With quality monitoring, the 
influence of encoding parameters and packet loss on the visual 
quality of the video stream is measured. When this quality 
drops below a certain level, depending on the problem, more 
robust encoding schemes or more efficient compression could 
be applied in order to restore the quality again. Depending on 
the quality monitoring algorithm, different syntax elements are 
used. Some consider the boundary strengths of the deblocking 
filter and the QP [7] whereas others need motion information 
bit allocation information [8]. 
Third, compressed domain watermarking could be applied in 
the network for later identification of the source or the 
destination of the video stream. As for quality monitoring, also 
with watermarking, different algorithms exist. As an example, 
some algorithms insert the watermark in the absolute levels of 
the residual information at the TU level in the video 
stream [1]. Leaving the residual size unencrypted is important 
when this application is considered in the network. 
Finally, there is the application of compressed domain 
transcoding [9] or more specifically, transrating. This form of 
transcoding slightly reduces the bit rate of the video stream 
without a full decoding and encoding loop, making it low 
complex and therefore suitable for in the network. With 
transrating, typically the residual information is requantized at 
a coarser QP while leaving the quadtree and prediction 
information unchanged [10]. Consequently, for this application 
to work, QP and residual information needs to remain 
unencrypted in the video stream. 
For H.264/AVC, a lot of encryption strategies have been 
investigated. Every proposed algorithm uses its own selection 
of syntax elements mainly selected from the following list: 
transformation matrices [11], intra prediction modes, residual 
coefficients, MVD [12], and MVD signs [13]. Other 
algorithms see the benefit of encrypting bypass encoded 
elements [14] because changing the values of these elements 
has no impact on the bit rate.  
For Scalable Video Coding (SVC) [15], the scalable 
extension of H.264/AVC, numerous encryption 
applications [16] are investigated as well. With SVC, a low 
quality base layer and high quality enhancement layer are 
packed together in a single video stream. Video scalability 
enables a low complex device to extract the low bit rate and 
low quality base layer from the video stream. By only 
encrypting this high quality enhancement layer, low quality 
preview functionality can be offered [17]. An overview of 
encryption techniques for H.264/AVC and SVC can be found 
in [18]. 
IV. ENCRYPTION FOR HEVC 
To keep format compliance after encryption, it is important 
that encrypted syntax elements do not change the parsing 
behavior of the decoder. For example, when encryption 
changes the CU block type from intra to inter, motion 
information is expected in the video stream. This mismatch 
will then most likely introduce incompatibility. Therefore, 
HEVC syntax elements which can be changed without 
influencing the decoding process are identified (see Table I). 
From this set of independently parsable syntax elements, a 
selection is considered for encryption, as will be described 
later.  
TABLE I 
INDEPENDENTLY PARSABLE SYNTAX ELEMENTS IN HEVC 
- Short-term reference picture set (RPS) 
- QP information (initial QP, chroma delta QP, slice delta QP,  
CU delta QP) 
- Inter information (reference picture indices, motion vector prediction 
indices, motion merge indices, motion vector differences) 
- Residual information 
- Deblocking filter parameters 
- Sample adaptive offset parameters 
 
Every selected syntax element is encrypted using the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [19]. This is a 
symmetric encryption algorithm, meaning that identical keys 
are used for both encryption and decryption. From a high 
abstraction level, AES can be viewed as a black box producing 
a sequence of pseudo random bits depending on the secret key. 
By transforming the input HEVC syntax element with these 
pseudo random bits, the encrypted syntax element is obtained. 
The applied transformation depends on the type of syntax 
element. 
The first syntax element from Table I that is considered in 
this paper is the RPS. The list of reference pictures in the RPS 
is mixed using the bits produced by the AES algorithm. To 
transform this list, position swapping is applied. When a one 
bit is produced by the AES algorithm, the reference picture is 
swapped with the next reference picture in the list. This 
swapping operation is applied on every reference picture in the 
list. When applying this technique, it should be considered that 
the RPS is included in the slice header so there is only one 
RPS for every slice. Given that there is only a small amount of 
information encrypted, the low security aspect of only 
encrypting this element should be kept in mind. 
Next, QP information is encrypted on the CU level. On this 
 level, a delta with the previously decoded QP is signaled. By 
pseudo randomly changing this delta QP over a wider range, 
the encryption strength can be controlled. Having larger 
variations implies a larger negative impact on compression 
efficiency, but a higher scrambling performance. Therefore, 
strengths varying from two up to eight are investigated. This 
strength indicates how much variation is put on delta QP. It 
specifies the range of values that the syntax element can be 
mapped to. For example, with a strength of four, a delta QP 
ranging from zero to three can be mapped on values in the 
same range depending on the pseudo random values generated 
by the AES algorithm.  
On the PU level in the video stream, the motion information 
can be encrypted. When the PU is merged with a neighboring 
PU, there is a merge index indicating with which neighbor to 
merge. This merge index can be encrypted by changing it into 
another valid index. This is done by the modular addition of a 
random number, generated by the AES algorithm, to the merge 
index.  
When MVs are signaled in the PU, first the reference picture 
index is signaled. Encrypting the reference picture index 
results in a motion compensation operation using a different 
reference picture. Similar to encryption of the merge index, a 
modular addition with the pseudo random number is made in 
order to encrypt the reference picture index. The idea of 
encrypting this syntax element is similar to encrypting the 
RPS. With both techniques the reference picture for motion 
compensation is changed. The difference is that this time 
encryption happens at a higher granularity. More data gets 
encrypted, so the security against brute force attacks is 
increased. 
After choosing the reference picture, a motion vector 
predictor is signaled. Similar to both previous indices, also the 
MVP index gets encrypted by a modular addition with the 
pseudo random code. 
The only remaining elements specifying the motion of a PU 
are the sign and the size of the motion vector difference. The 
MVD sign is represented by one bit, so AES will provide a 
pseudo random bit to perform an eXclusive OR (XOR) 
operation on. The advantage of encrypting the MVD sign is 
that it is bypass encoded in the CABAC engine. Consequently, 
encrypting this element will have no impact on the 
compression performance of the video stream [20]. For the 
size of the motion vector, there is again the tradeoff between 
scrambling performance and impact on compression 
efficiency. Therefore, as for delta QP, strengths varying 
between two and eight are investigated.  
After the PU data, the video stream contains TU information. 
Within a TU, the residual sign and residual size can be 
identified as independent information. Similar to the MVD 
sign, the residual sign is represented as a bypass encoded bit as 
well. The 1-bit XOR operation is performed on this element in 
order to encrypt it. Again, the bypass property enables 
encryption of this element without impact on the compression 
efficiency [20]. When encrypting the sign information, special 
care must be taken when the sign hiding tool called SDH is 
enabled in the video stream. Changing the signs can change the 
parity resulting in a change of the residual size. For middlebox 
applications modifying the residual size it is advised to also 
avoid encryption of the residual sign when SDH is enabled. 
Encryption of the residual size can happen conforming to the 
encryption of delta QP and MVD size. Also for residual size 
the tradeoff caused by varying strengths between two and eight 
can be made. 
As a final step in the decoding process, the in-loop filters are 
applied on the decoded picture. The downside of encrypting 
parameters of these filters is that they are only signaled once 
for every slice, similar to the RPS. Consequently, a low 
amount of information is encrypted, resulting in a security risk. 
As an additional risk, disabling these filters when they 
originally should be applied will have a low impact on the 
quality. To evaluate the impact of encrypting filter 
information, the SAO type is scrambled. This is a bypass 
coded syntax element, so there will be no impact on 
compression efficiency. 
V. RESULTS 
A. Methodology 
To measure the scrambling performance and the bit rate 
impact of encrypting the different syntax elements of HEVC, 
first a set of sequences is encoded without encryption, called 
the original video streams. Under the same conditions, this set 
is compressed with encryption of a certain element enabled. 
These video streams are the encrypted video streams. Then, 
the encrypted streams are also decoded by an untrusted 
decoder which does not have the decryption key, generating 
the untrusted video streams. Consequently, the bit rate impact 
of enabling encryption can be measured between the original 
and the encrypted video streams. The scrambling performance 
is measured between the untrusted and the encrypted video 
streams. 
All the video streams are generated with a modified version 
of the HEVC reference Model (HM) v10.0 [21]. Modifications 
are applied to enable AES encryption on all the listed syntax 
elements. HM v10.0 is the first reference software version 
conforming to the finalized standard in January 2013. 
Although the encryption process is included in the HEVC 
encoder, it is written independently from the encoding process. 
Therefore, results obtained from these measurements are also 
applicable on encryption algorithms performing the encryption 
process after encoding, or even in the network. To measure the 
impact of the proposed encryption methods, all of these 
methods are tested on a set of sequences as listed in Table II. 
This set contains 25 test sequences (8-bit) ranging in 
resolution from 416x240 up to 2560x1600. The content varies 
between synthetically generated content (ChinaSpeed) and 
difficult to compress natural content (PeopleOnStreet). 
As encoding parameters, a Group Of Picture (GOP) size of 
eight is chosen. This implies that seven bidirectionally 
 TABLE II 
EVALUATED TEST SEQUENCES 
Sequence Frame 
count 
Frame 
rate 
Resolution 
Traffic 300 30fps 2560x1600 
PeopleOnStreet 150 30fps 2560x1600 
Kimono 240 24fps 1920x1080 
ParkScene 240 24fps 1920x1080 
Cactus 500 50fps 1920x1080 
BasketballDrive 500 50fps 1920x1080 
BQTerrace 600 60fps 1920x1080 
FourPeople 600 60fps 1280x720 
Johnny 600 60fps 1280x720 
KristenAndSara 600 60fps 1280x720 
Vidyo1 600 60fps 1280x720 
Vidyo3 600 60fps 1280x720 
Vidyo4 600 60fps 1280x720 
ChinaSpeed 500 30fps 1280x720 
SlideEditing 300 30fps 1280x720 
SlideShow 500 20fps 1280x720 
BasketballDrill 500 50fps 832x480 
BQMall 600 60fps 832x480 
PartyScene 500 50fps 832x480 
RaceHorses 300 30fps 832x480 
BasketDrllTxt 500 50fps 832x480 
BasketballPass 500 50fps 416x240 
BQSquare 600 60fps 416x240 
BlowingBubbles 500 50fps 416x240 
RaceHorses 300 30fps 416x240 
 
TABLE III 
RESOLUTION DEPENDENT RATE POINTS FOR CONSTANT BITRATE 
ENCODING 
Sequence Rate 1 
[kbps] 
Rate 2 
[kbps] 
Rate 3 
[kbps] 
Rate 4 
[kbps] 
2560x1600 30000 20000 10000 5000 
1920x1080 20000 10000 5000 2500 
1280x720 10000 5000 2500 1000 
832x480 10000 5000 2500 1000 
416x240 5000 2500 1000 500 
 
predicted pictures are inserted between every unidirectionally 
predicted picture. A hierarchical-B structure is chosen for its 
good compression performance. To create a realistic 
broadcasting scenario, a random access period of one second 
is configured. These random access pictures are encoded as 
open-GOP intra pictures. To evaluate the encryption 
performance over a realistic quality range, QP values of 22, 
27, 32, and 37 are defined. For the scenario where delta QP 
syntax elements are encrypted, constant bitrate compression is 
applied. With constant bitrate compression, a rate control 
algorithm changes the delta QP values for every CU to obtain 
a nearly constant bit distribution throughout the video stream. 
The resolution dependent rate points at which the video 
streams are encoded can be found in Table III.  
To compare the bitrate impact between the original and the 
encrypted video streams, the Bjøntegaard delta (BD) 
bitrate [22] is used. For this metric, first, rate-distortion curves 
are plotted on a graph. Rate is expressed in bits per second and 
distortion is expressed with the Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio 
(PSNR) between both decoded video streams. By taking the 
average bitrate difference at the same quality, a general 
number indicating the bitrate increase can be calculated. The 
BD-rate increase therefore expresses the average bitrate 
increase over the evaluated quality range.  
To measure the scrambling performance, the PSNR and 
Structural SIMilarity (SSIM) measures are used. More 
specifically, the delta PSNR and delta SSIM between the 
encrypted and the untrusted video stream is calculated. This 
delta indicates how much quality is lost for an untrusted 
decoder compared to the quality of a trusted decoder. First, in 
subsection B, the quality impact after encryption of each of the 
described syntax elements will be discussed followed by the 
measured impact on compression efficiency (see 
subsection C). 
The impact of enabling encryption and decryption in the 
encoder and decoder is negligible compared to encoder and 
decoder time. Therefore, no results are given on time 
measurements of enabling encryption. 
B. Scrambling Performance 
An overall comparison of the scrambling performance of all 
the described syntax elements can be found in Fig. 1 and 
Fig. 2. In the delta PSNR curves of Fig. 1, there seems to be a 
lower impact on higher QP values. It should be noted that 
higher QP values have lower PSNRs to start with. When 
expressed as a percentage, the delta PSNR would be more 
constant over the QP range, comparable to the SSIM 
measurements (see Fig. 2). 
The syntax elements with the least impact (-0.30 dB) on the 
decoded quality of the untrusted decoder are the SAO 
parameters. The exact average values can be found in 
overview Table IV. Considering the ease of getting around this 
encryption strategy by disabling loop filtering, the minimal 
amount of encrypted coefficients, and the low impact on the 
untrusted quality, only encrypting SAO parameters or loop 
filter coefficients in general is not a good strategy.  
Next on the quality impact scale, all the motion related 
information can be found. When encrypting motion 
information, random access pictures remain undistorted. In our 
measurements, this results in one undistorted picture every 
second. A second observation about motion encryption is that 
texture information remains recognizable for the viewer. 
Objects or people can still be identified, but their appearance 
is largely deformed with blocky structures. The impact of 
encrypting motion related information ranges from -3.3 dB 
PSNR for RPS encryption up to -15.5 dB for merge index or 
MV sign encryption. So, first in this list is the encryption of 
RPS information. Together with the low impact on quality by 
an untrusted decoder, it was also mentioned that there is only a 
small amount of data encrypted, resulting in a vulnerability 
risk.  
A syntax element having a low impact without being a risk 
for brute force attacks is the MVD size encrypted with a 
strength of two. Depending on the strength, the delta PSNR 
impact of MVD size encryption varies between -5.2 dB at 
strength two down to -10.6 dB at strength eight. A detailed 
illustration of how the scrambling performance can be 
gradually increased with increased strength can be found in 
  
(a) original 
 
(b) PU: MVD size 2  
 
(c) PU: ref. pic. idx  
 
(d) TU: residual sign 
 
(e) CU: delta QP 2 
Fig. 5. Example decoded picture from the BlowingBubbles 
sequence (picture 142). (a) Decoded by trusted decoder having the 
decryption key. (b-e) Encrypted with a subset of the investigated 
syntax elements and decoded by an untrusted decoder.   
 
Fig. 1. Scrambling performance, expressed in delta PSNR, of 
encrypting different syntax elements. Larger absolute deltas 
indicate higher scrambling impact on video streams decoded by an 
untrusted decoder.   
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Scrambling performance, expressed in delta SSIM, of 
encrypting different syntax elements. Larger absolute deltas 
indicate higher scrambling impact on video streams decoded by an 
untrusted decoder.   
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Scrambling performance, expressed in delta PSNR, of 
encrypting the MV size at different strengths. Larger absolute 
deltas indicate higher scrambling impact on video streams decoded 
by an untrusted decoder.   
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Scrambling performance, expressed in delta SSIM, of 
encrypting the MV size at different strengths. Larger absolute 
deltas indicate higher scrambling impact on video streams decoded 
by an untrusted decoder.   
 
 
 TABLE IV 
OVERVIEW OF BD-RATE INCREASE, DELTA PSNR, AND DELTA 
SSIM OF EACH INVESTIGATED HEVC SYNTAX ELEMENT  
(IN BOLD: TECHNIQUES WITH THEORETICAL 0.00% BD-RATE 
INCREASE. 0.00% GAIN AFTER ROUNDING NOT IN BOLD.) 
Encrypted element Strength BD-
rate 
Avg. delta 
PSNR 
Avg. delta 
SSIM 
-RPS - 0.62 -3.3 -0.03 
-CU: delta QP  2 0.09 -23.6 -0.47 
-CU: delta QP 3 0.13 -23.7 -0.48 
-CU: delta QP 4 0.17 -24.6 -0.49 
-CU: delta QP 5 0.23 -24.9 -0.51 
-CU: delta QP 6 0.26 -24.9 -0.52 
-CU: delta QP 7 0.28 -25.0 -0.53 
-CU: delta QP 8 0.31 -25.2 -0.53 
-PU: ref. pic. idx - 0.52 -13.3 -0.23 
-PU: merge idx - 4.56 -15.5 -0.31 
-PU: MVP idx - 0.05 -15.0 -0.29 
-PU: MVD sign - 0.00 -15.5 -0.31 
-PU: MVD size 2 0.00 -5.2 -0.03 
-PU: MVD size 3 0.18 -6.7 -0.05 
-PU: MVD size 4 0.36 -7.9 -0.07 
-PU: MVD size 5 0.39 -8.7 -0.08 
-PU: MVD size 6 0.37 -9.5 -0.10 
-PU: MVD size 7 0.47 -10.2 -0.12 
-PU: MVD size 8 0.73 -10.6 -0.13 
-TU: residual sign - 0.00 -21.9 -0.63 
-TU: residual size 2 0.33 -21.5 -0.36 
-TU: residual size 3 0.97 -21.2 -0.36 
-TU: residual size 4 1.49 -21.5 -0.38 
-TU: residual size 5 2.48 -21.5 -0.38 
-TU: residual size 6 3.10 -21.7 -0.40 
-TU: residual size 7 3.99 -21.5 -0.41 
-TU: residual size 8 4.64 -21.6 -0.42 
-SAO - 0.00 -0.30 -0.00 
-MVD sign+residual sign - 0.00 -22.1 -0.68 
-MVD sign+residual 
sign+delta QP 
2 0.09 -25.5 -0.77 
-MVD sign+residual sign+ 
delta QP+residual size 
2 0.42 -26.1 -0.81 
Fig. 3. Scrambling performance can be further improved by 
encrypting the reference picture index. With an average delta 
PSNR of -13.3 dB a slightly more deformed video stream can 
be obtained. The next syntax elements on the scrambling 
performance scale related to motion information are the MVP 
index, the merge index, and the MVD sign. These syntax 
elements deform the pictures for an untrusted decoder by  
-15.0 dB, -15.5 dB, and -15.5 dB respectively. 
For the encryption of SAO and motion related parameters, 
the same trend in scrambling performance can be observed in 
the delta SSIM graphs as given in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4. On an 
SSIM scale, the impact of SAO encryption gets rounded to 
0.00 indicating the small influence of its encryption. For the 
motion related elements, low impacts can again be observed 
for RPS and MVD size elements. For encryption of RPS and 
MVD size with a strength of two, an equal delta SSIM of -0.03 
can be noticed in Fig. 2 and Table IV. Similar as for PSNR, 
depending on the strength of the MVD size encryption, the 
decrease in SSIM can be observed in Fig. 4. Again, next in 
line, reference picture index, MVP index, merge index, and 
MVD sign can be found. Illustrations giving an idea about the 
impact of MVD size encryption at strength two and reference 
picture index encryption can be found in Fig. 5 (b) and (c) 
respectively. 
Next, syntax elements deforming the texture information can 
be found in the delta PSNR comparison in Fig. 1. Based on 
this delta PSNR, encrypting residual size at strength two and 
residual sign should have the same PSNR impact on the 
encrypted video stream. On the contrary, when looking at the 
delta SSIM graphs in Fig. 2 encryption of the residual sign has 
a far larger impact than encrypting the residual size at strength 
two. Visually, it is observed that SSIM more closely 
corresponds to reality. The result of decoding the 
BlowingBubbles sequence with the residual sign encrypted, 
can be found in Fig. 5 (d). In our tested scenario, most residual 
information can be found in the random access pictures of the 
video stream. This is caused by the fixed QP setting combined 
with the hierarchical-B coding structure. Consequently, the 
main impact of residual encryption could be observed in the 
random access pictures every second. In these pictures, no 
prior decoded pictures are used, so totally different colors get 
introduced by the pseudo random encryption information in 
these random access pictures. Inter predicted pictures contain 
less residual data, so the impact on the initially wrong textured 
information is low. What can be observed are strangely 
textured objects that move realistically. Printed in this paper 
and relying on the delta PSNR or delta SSIM graph, 
encrypting these residual elements seem to deform the video 
stream a lot, but the natural motion of these strangely colored 
shapes reveals their identity. 
Finally, encryption of the delta QP can be seen as a 
technique impacting the PSNR the most. Based on the SSIM 
measurements, there is again a PSNR-SSIM mismatch when 
encrypting the residual sign, but the exact numbers are 
irrelevant compared to the real deformations each technique 
makes. In Fig. 5 (e), an example is given of deformations on 
the BlowingBubbles sequence. In the left top corner of the 
picture, it starts with low mismatches between the original and 
the deformed picture. Going more to the right bottom corner, 
the QP more and more mismatches the original QP resulting in 
more deformation of the texture. In the right bottom corner, 
the mismatch even becomes so high that saturation of the pixel 
information results in saturated colors. Also for this texture 
based encryption scheme, the motion information remains 
unchanged. So, the observation of strangely colored objects 
moving with natural motion can be made for this technique. 
C. Impact on Compression Efficiency 
With the BD-rate metric, the impact on compression 
efficiency between the original and the encrypted video stream 
is calculated. In Table IV, an overview is given of the average 
BD-rate increase of encrypting the different syntax elements. 
In bold, the elements encoded with bypass compression are 
marked. Because of the bypass compression, encrypting these 
values gives a theoretical 0.00% BD-rate increase. 
Measurements confirmed that the change of these values has 
no impact on the compression of that element or any other 
syntax element related to it. As interesting bypass coded 
 elements MVD sign and residual sign should be mentioned. 
These two elements can already provide motion scrambling 
and texture deformation at no compression efficiency cost. 
When preview functionality needs to pass through more visual 
information, SAO, RPS, and MVD size can be considered. 
Certainly the MVD size encryption at strength two can be 
interesting as well because of its negligible impact on 
compression efficiency (0.00%). Regarding compression 
efficiency loss, encrypting the MVD size up to a strength of 
eight only increases the bitrate with 0.73%. Depending on the 
application and the restrictions of middleboxes in the network, 
this can still be a valuable option. From the motion related 
syntax elements, only caution needs to be applied if encryption 
of the merge index should be considered. Encrypting this 
element increases the bitrate on average with 4.56%, which is 
certainly significant for encryption purposes. For deformation 
of the texture, encrypting the residual size can be an alternative 
for the residual sign, but the strength should not be increased 
too much. At strengths two and three, a reasonable BD-rate 
penalty of respectively 0.33% and 0.97% can be observed. 
Higher strengths increase this BD-rate up to 4.64%. Improving 
the strength for this element is also less relevant because the 
quality is not deformed a lot with increasing strength. This was 
also observed during informal visual tests. Lower quality 
impacts can be found when encrypting delta QP information. 
With a strength of two, only 0.09% BD-rate increase is 
measured. With encryption of delta QP, the impact of higher 
strengths does not impact the BD-rate significantly. Delta 
PSNR, delta SSIM, and observations did not indicate more 
explicit deformations as well. Therefore, choosing higher 
strengths than two seems to be irrelevant. 
As already mentioned in [20], combining encryption of 
different syntax elements results in adding together BD-rate 
increases. This is obvious because encryption happens 
independently from the encoding process. PSNR and SSIM 
measurements are not additive because deformations of the 
same kind can influence each other. Encryption of motion 
related elements will influence each other’s quality results. 
Depending on the application and therefore on the 
constraints of the adaptation devices or other middleboxes in 
the network, a selection of different syntax elements to encrypt 
can be chosen. When preview functionality is of importance, 
motion information based techniques provide a low impact on 
the quality of untrusted decoders. Except from the merge 
index, all other motion related elements provide equal kind of 
deformations at low compression efficiency cost. Then it is 
only a matter of tuning the amount of scrambling to the 
preview requirements. When deformation for untrusted 
decoders needs to be higher, texture deforming syntax 
elements like residual sign, residual size, or delta QP can be 
chosen. For residual size encryption, the encryption strength 
should not be increased because it would only impact 
compression efficiency without increased scrambling 
performance.  
D. Combinations of different elements 
To increase scrambling performance, combinations of 
different encryption techniques can be applied. Three example 
combinations are given at the bottom of Table IV. By 
combining two syntax elements having a theoretical impact of 
0.00%, again no impact on compression efficiency can be 
observed. When the techniques deform different aspects of the 
video, then visually, the distortions add up as well, but this is 
not reflected in delta PSNR and SSIM results. The third 
example adds delta QP encryption and residual size encryption 
to the combination resulting in an addition of the BD-rate 
increases. Visually, the impact of residual size will be a small 
addition compared to the impact of residual sign.  
E. Comparison with H.264/AVC 
In H.264/AVC, two types of entropy coding can be chosen, 
namely Context-Adaptive Variable-Length Coding (CAVLC) 
and the more efficient CABAC. With CAVLC, everything 
except the residual information has fixed codewords, so 
encryption can easily be applied without loss in compression 
efficiency. When CABAC is used in H.264/AVC, the suffix 
part of the MVD, residual sign, and suffix from residual data 
are bypass encoded. Encrypting these elements will therefore 
also result in 0.00% BD-rate increase, at a similar scrambling 
performance as in this paper with HEVC. So, looking at 
history, the shift from CAVLC to CABAC in H.264/AVC 
made it more difficult to perform encryption without impacting 
compression efficiency. With the shift from H.264/AVC to 
HEVC, one would expect the same phenomenon, because 
improved compression efficiency comes at the cost of 
increased dependency between syntax elements. This paper 
shows that with HEVC it is still possible to encrypt certain 
bypass encoded elements at no cost. In addition to the 
elements that were used in H.264/AVC, results from 
previously uninvestigated elements are added (e.g RPS, CU: 
delta QP, PU: ref. pic. Idx, PU: merge idx, PU: MVP idx, and 
SAO). With these measurements, showing such large variety in 
encryption strengths, preview functionality can easily be 
provided at a desired quality. In contrast, with H.264/AVC, it 
was more challenging [17] to enable such preview 
functionality. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When advanced video applications, located in the network, 
are included in the video distribution chain, it is beneficial to 
encrypt only syntax elements from the video stream which are 
not used by these applications. In this way, the decryption key 
must not be entrusted to these middlebox devices. 
Additionally, providing standard compliant encryption 
guarantees proper operation of devices handling the encrypted 
video stream. With the provided results on compression 
efficiency and scrambling performance, decisions can be made 
about which elements should be encrypted at what 
compression efficiency loss. 
 REFERENCES 
[1] A. Boho et al., “End-to-end security for video distribution: the 
combination of encryption, watermarking, and video adaptation,” IEEE 
Signal Process. Mag., vol 30, no.2, pp. 97-107, Mar. 2013. 
[2] R. Iqbal, S. Shirmohammadi, A. El Saddik, and J. Zhao, “Compressed-
domain video processing for adaptation, encryption, and 
authentication,” IEEE Trans. Multimedia, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 38–50, 
Apr. 2008. 
[3] N. Thomas, D. Redmill, and D. Bull, “Secure transcoders for single 
layer video data,” Signal Process.- Image Comm., vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 
196–207, Mar. 2010.  
[4] G. J. Sullivan, J.-R. Ohm, W.-J. Han, T. Wiegand, and T.Wiegand, 
“Overview of the high efficiency video coding (HEVC) standard,” IEEE 
Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Technol., vol. 22, no. 12, pp. 1649 –1668, 
Dec. 2012. 
[5] T. Wiegand, G. J. Sullivan, G. Bjøntegaard, and A. Luthra, “Overview 
of the H.264/AVC video coding standard,” IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. 
Video Technol., vol. 13, no. 7, pp. 560–576, Jul. 2003.  
[6] J.-R. Ohm, G. J. Sullivan, H. Schwarz, T. K. Tan, and T. Wiegand, 
“Comparison of the coding efficiency of video coding standards 
including high efficiency video coding (HEVC),” IEEE Trans. Circuits 
Syst. Video Technol., vol. 22, no. 12, pp. 1669 –1684, Dec. 2012. 
[7] S.-O. Lee, K.-S. Jung, D.-G. Sim, “Real-time objective quality 
assessment based on coding parameters extracted from H.264/AVC 
bitstream,” IEEE Trans. Consum. Electron., vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 1071– 
1078, May 2010. 
[8] X. Lin, H. Ma, L. Luo, and Y. Chen, “No-reference video quality 
assessment in the compressed domain,” IEEE Trans. Consum. 
Electron., vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 505– 512, May 2012. 
[9] M. Kim, H. Lee, and S. Sull, “Efficient transform domain transcoding: 
intra frame of H.264/AVC to JPEG,” IEEE Trans. Consum. Electron., 
vol. 57, no. 3, pp. 1362– 1369, Aug. 2011. 
[10] J. De Cock, S. Notebaert, P. Lambert, and R. Van de Walle, 
“Requantization transcoding for H.264/AVC video coding,” Signal 
Process.:Image Commun., vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 235-254, Apr. 2010. 
[11] S.-K. Au Yeung, S. Zhu, and B. Zeng, “Partial video encryption based 
on alternating transforms,” IEEE Signal Process. Lett., vol. 16, no. 10, 
pp. 893–896, Oct. 2009. 
[12] S. Lian, Z. Liu, Z. Ren, and H. Wang, “Secure advanced video coding 
based on selective encryption algorithms,” IEEE Trans. Consum. 
Electron., vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 621– 629, May 2006. 
[13] Y. Wang, M. O’Neill, and F. Kurugollu, “The improved sign bit 
encryption of motion vectors for H.264/AVC,” 2012, pp. 1752–1756, 
20th European Signal Process. Conf. (EUSIPCO), Bucharest, Romania, 
Aug. 2012. 
[14] Z. Shahid, M. Chaumont, and W. Puech, “Fast protection of 
H.264/AVC by selective encryption of CAVLC and CABAC for I and P 
frames,” IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Technol., vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 
565–576, May 2011. 
[15] H. Schwarz, D. Marpe, and T. Wiegand, “Overview of the scalable 
video coding extension of the H.264/AVC standard,” IEEE Trans. 
Circuits Syst. Video Technol., vol. 17, no. 9, pp. 1103–1120, Sep. 2007. 
[16] Z. Shahid, M. Chaumont, and W. Puech, “Selective and scalable 
encryption of enhancement layers for dyadic scalable H.264/AVC by 
scrambling of scan patterns,” IEEE Int. Conf. on Image Process. (ICIP 
2009), Cairo, Egypt, pp. 1265–1268, Nov. 2009. 
[17] E. Magli, M. Grangetto, and G. Olmo, “Transparent encryption 
techniques for H.264/AVC and H.264/SVC compressed video,” Signal 
Process., vol. 91, no. 5, pp. 1103–1114, May 2011. 
[18] T. Stuetz and A. Uhl, “A survey of H.264 AVC/SVC encryption,” IEEE 
Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Technol., vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 325–339, Mar. 
2012. 
[19] NIST, “Advanced encryption standard (AES),” FIPS Publication 197, 
Nov. 2001.  
[20] G. Van Wallendael, A. Boho, J. De Cock, A. Munteanu, and R. Van de 
Walle, “Encryption for high efficiency video coding with video 
adaptation capabilities,” IEEE Int. Conf. on Consum. Electron. (ICCE 
2013), Las Vegas, USA, Jan. 2013. 
[21] I.-K. Kim, K. McCann, B. Bross, S.-i. Sekiguchi, and W.-J. Han, “HM8: 
high efficiency video coding (HEVC) test model 8 encoder description,” 
JCTVC-J1002, Stockholm, Sweden, Jul. 2012. 
[22] G. Bjøntegaard, “Calculation of average PSNR differences between RD-
curves,” document VCEG-M33 of ITU-T Video Coding Experts Group 
(VCEG), Apr. 2001. 
 
BIOGRAPHIES 
 
Glenn Van Wallendael (S’12) obtained the M.Sc. 
degree in Applied Engineering from the University 
College of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium, in 2006 and the 
M.Sc. degree in Engineering from Ghent University, 
Ghent, Belgium in 2008. Since then, he is working 
towards a Ph.D. at Multimedia Lab, Ghent University, 
with the financial support of the Agency for Innovation by 
Science and Technology (IWT). Main topics of interest 
are video compression including scalable video compression and transcoding. 
 
Andras Boho received his M.Sc. in Electronic and 
Computer Engineering at the Pázmány Péter Catholic 
University, Hungary, in 2009. Since 2010, he has been 
working towards a Ph.D. at the COSIC research group of 
the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. 
 
 
 
 
Jan De Cock (M’06) obtained the M.S. and Ph.D. 
degrees in Engineering from Ghent University, Belgium, 
in 2004 and 2009, respectively. Since 2004 he has been 
working at Multimedia Lab, Ghent University, and 
iMinds. His research interests include video compression 
and transcoding, scalable video coding, and multimedia 
applications. 
 
 
Adrian Munteanu (M'07) is professor at the Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel, Belgium, and research leader of the 
4Media group at the Institute of Broadband Technology - 
IBBT, Belgium. Adrian Munteanu received the MSc 
degree in Electronics and Telecommunications from 
Politehnica University of Bucharest, Romania, in 1994, the 
MSc degree in Biomedical Engineering from University of 
Patras, Greece, in 1996, and the Doctorate degree in 
Applied Sciences (awarded with highest honors) from Vrije Universiteit 
Brussel (VUB), Belgium, in 2003. In the period 2004-2010 he was post-
doctoral fellow with the Fund for Scientific Research - Flanders (FWO), 
Belgium, and since 2007, he is professor at VUB. 
Adrian Munteanu is the author of more than 200 journal and conference 
publications, book chapters, and contributions to standards and holds 7 
patents in image and video coding. Adrian Munteanu is the recipient of the 
2004 BARCO-FWO prize for his PhD work, the co-recipient of the Most 
Cited Paper Award from Elsevier for 2007 and of the Best Paper Award at the 
2011 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Distributed Smart Cameras. 
Adrian Munteanu currently serves as Associate Editor for IEEE Transactions 
on Multimedia. His research interests include image, video and 3D graphics 
coding, distributed source coding, error-resilient coding, multimedia 
transmission over networks, and statistical modeling. 
 
Rik Van de Walle (M’99) received his M.Sc. and 
PhD degrees in Engineering from Ghent University, 
Belgium in 1994 and 1998 respectively. After a visiting 
scholarship at the University of Arizona (Tucson, USA), 
he returned to Ghent University, where he became 
professor of multimedia systems and applications, and 
head of the Multimedia Lab. His current research 
interests include multimedia content delivery, 
presentation and archiving, coding and description of multimedia data, 
content adaptation, and interactive (mobile) multimedia applications. 
